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Abstract:  Recent British welfare reform involves the creation of a managed 
welfare market for the delivery of employment programmes. This article 
critically reviews evidence on the development and impacts of such markets 
in Australia, the USA and the Netherlands. It considers the emergence of 
problems with ‘creaming’ and ‘parking’ of participants and the challenges that 
'market makers' must meet if they are to secure anticipated improvements in 




The British welfare state has changed radically. The rights and responsibilities 
of adults without jobs have been redefined and the public sector institutions 
that deliver working age benefits and employment programmes have been 
reformed. The latest phase of change involves both extending job search and 
work activity obligations to lone parents and people with health problems and 
disabilities and a “major transformation” in the delivery of welfare to work 
programmes (DWP, 2007a, p.9). In future most employment- related services 
for people on working age benefits will be delivered via a ‘managed welfare 
market’. In this ‘quasi market’ services will be delivered by a range of private, 
voluntary and public sector organisations.  
 
During the past ten years there has been much experimentation with private 
sector delivery of employment programmes and how the Government 
contracts with it. Recently there has been increased emphasis on paying 
providers for performance in getting people into jobs and on Jobcentre Plus 
(JCP) to reduce transaction costs by entering into larger contracts with fewer 
providers.  
 
There was further significant change after the recommendations of the ‘Freud 
Report’ (2007) and the centralisation of procurement within the Department 
for Work and Pensions (DWP). This culminated in the DWP’s ‘Commissioning 
Strategy’ that detailed Government plans to simplify and rationalise existing 
welfare to work contracts (2008). 
 
DWP now is directly responsible for commissioning and managing the welfare 
market. DWP envisages that it will do “80 per cent of its business” with a 
“stable core of reliable top tier” or prime contractors capable of delivering 
multiple contracts across the country (DWP, 2008a, p.10). Smaller providers 
will act mainly as subcontractors. Successful prime contractors will receive 
contracts usually of five years’ duration, with the possibility of two year 
extensions. Most of the funding initially will reward sustained job outcomes for 
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employment that lasts for up to six months, but the aspiration is to go further 
and reward providers if they keep people in employment for a year or 
eighteen months.  
 
The principles of the new strategy will be applied first to the ‘flexible New 
Deal’ (FND) that replaces all existing New Deal and Employment Zone 
provision for long term unemployed job seekers from 2009 (DWP, 2007b). 
The future delivery of employability services through these performance- 
based contracts represents “a major milestone in [the] welfare reform 
programme” and “the rewards will be high, with longer contracts and a 
growing market” (Purnell, 2008) for successful providers.   
 
The transition to prime contractors is likely to reshape the ‘welfare to work’ 
landscape with for-profit organisations, with access to risk capital, dominating 
service provision. The future for many voluntary and community- based 
organisations, and some for-profit providers, will be as subcontractors. The 
transition also will pose new challenges to local employment partnerships 
which aim to coordinate the fragmented programmes that deliver skills and 
employment. 
 
Consensus and International Comparisons 
 
There is an apparent consensus amongst senior British politicians from all 
parties that delivery of employment programmes by for-profit and third sector 
organisations through a welfare market will lead to service innovation, 
improved accountability, better job outcomes, greater value for money, and 
better customer service. These claims are justified by frequent reference to 
‘international best practice’ and to evidence from British Employment Zones. 
In particular, the respective proposals of all the parties point to the ‘success’ 
of welfare reform in countries, such as Australia, the USA and the 
Netherlands, that began to contract out case management and employment 
assistance services on a large scale in the 1990s.  
 
While the three countries provide useful comparators for the UK they have 
distinctive labour markets, governance arrangements and welfare systems. 
Australia and the USA have a federal system of government and in the 
Netherlands and USA state and local government play a direct role in the 
design and delivery of some working age benefits, unlike in either the UK or 
Australia. The Netherlands also invests more in labour market programmes 
and provides more generous benefits for working age people (OECD, 2006).  
 
From measuring performance to rewarding outcomes 
  
The transition to performance-based contracting took place initially in the 
USA, and is embedded in the delivery of training, employment and welfare to 
work programmes. Federal legislation typically devolves funding and 
purchasing power to state governments and increasingly their contracts with 
delivery agencies link explicit performance outcomes with financial incentives 
to motivate agency staff. Over time these outcomes have evolved to include 
placement in unsubsidised employment; retention for at least six months in 
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such employment; increased earnings; a reduction in welfare dependency; 
and, in some programmes, skills acquisition - including basic skills and 
qualifications.  
 
Other countries were influenced by US developments and GB was the first 
European country to extensively use ‘output related funding’. Training and 
Enterprise Councils (England and Wales) and Local Enterprise Companies 
(Scotland), modelled on the US experience, were introduced in 1987. They 
were funded through performance-based contracts with an increasing 
proportion of funding dependent on job outcomes and qualifications gained. 
The British Employment Service also introduced job outcome performance 
contracts for some of the separate provision it outsourced.  
 
Job outcome contracts subsequently were central to the design of the new 
market -based employment services systems introduced in Australia and the 
Netherlands in the late 1990s.  
 
The Australian Job Network (JN) was created in 1998. It is a managed quasi-
market providing scope for competition, some degree of choice for 
jobseekers, flexibility in the way services are delivered, and financial rewards 
for successful providers. Prices used to be determined through the tender and 
contracting process but now are set at fixed rates by the purchasing agency. 
Currently the JN is comprised of a core of 99 ‘generalist’ and ‘specialist’ 
providers delivering a full range of services, supplemented by a wider network 
of licensed Job Placement Organisations which provide vacancy finding and 
job matching services. The JN has experienced three distinct periods marked 
by different ‘Employment Service Contracts’ and is about to undergo further 
reform in a contracting regime to be introduced for 2009-2012.  
 
In the Netherlands a ‘reintegration market’ was introduced in 2003 when the 
UWV, the social insurance purchaser, and municipalities were required to 
contract out their employment assistance programmes. The UWV, the largest 
sole purchaser, has successively adapted the market as it has sought to 
improve the efficiency of its contracted provision, personalise support and 
target intensive services at harder to help participants. The initial tendering 
system involved relatively small contracts designed to tackle the barriers of 
particular groups with prices and outcome payment terms differentiated 
according to assessed distance from the labour market. The tender system 
now has been displaced by a modular purchasing framework and Individual 
Reintegration Agreements. These ‘IROs’ give harder to help participants more 
personal control over services and pay contactors higher fees and outcome 
payments for working with more disadvantaged participants. 
 
Municipalities were under pressure to contract out their reintegration services 
for social assistance claimants but this requirement now has been dropped. 
This followed the introduction of a radical new central government funding 
system, partly modelled on US ‘block grants’. The ‘Fund for Work and Income’ 
has two components. The ‘income fund’ pays for means tested assistance 
and is determined using economic and social indicators. A separate flexible 
‘work fund’ is designed to pay for employment or reintegration services and 
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can be used to pay only for such services. Any surplus in the ‘work fund’ 
returns to the Ministry. In contrast should the municipality pay less than it is 
allocated in the ‘income fund’ it can use the surplus as it wishes. 
 
Municipalities thus have a powerful incentive to reduce the number of people 
claiming social assistance and many have done so through the introduction of 
‘Work First’ programmes. These require selected social assistance recipients 
to participate in work or work- related activities. In terms of delivery the 
municipalities act as local prime contractors and, using devolved budgets, are 
expected to provide employment services either in-house or through contracts 
with private agencies. 
 
Subsequently other countries, such as Denmark, Canada and Israel, have 
implemented equally radical market- based reforms (Gould, 2007; Lilley and 
Hartwich, 2008). Some European countries, such as Germany, France and 
Sweden, are experimenting with the introduction of job outcome performance 
contracts (Jordan, 2008). 
 
The risks involved in contracting out employment and welfare to work 
services 
 
The transition to performance-based contracts offers potential for innovation, 
flexibility and efficiency savings but the difficulties of managing complex 
services through contracts pose risks to service access, costs, quality and 
accountability (Heinrich and Choi, 2007).  
 
There are three particular risks commonly thought to be intensified by 
performance and outcome based contracts. The first is ‘cream-skimming’, 
where contractors who are paid by results select more job ready participants. 
This is a particular risk when the group eligible for a service exceeds the 
number of available places and/or when providers can choose whom to admit 
to a service. ‘Creaming’ can occur even when the provider is required to take 
designated participants. The risk then is that a provider may, deliberately or 
unconsciously concentrate efforts on those participants more easily placed in 
employment. The third risk is ‘parking’ where more costly to help participants 
receive only minimal services and make little progress in a programme. If 
such participants secure employment through their own efforts this represents 
a ‘windfall’ gain for the provider.  
 
Other risks relate to the ability to regulate and ensure the quality of the 
services delivered by surplus or profit-seeking agencies; and the potential for 
market failure, where government has no choice but to intervene and either 
‘bail out’ a failing provider or quickly find an alternative to continue the delivery 
of services. 
 
Welfare Markets in the USA, Australia and the Netherlands 
 
Whilst it is difficult to disentangle the impacts of market- based delivery 
systems from the wider work- based welfare reforms that they are designed to 
implement, there is a wealth of analysis and evidence on all three countries. 
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This body of knowledge gives valuable insight into issues likely to emerge as 
the British welfare market evolves (Finn, 2007; 2008). 
 
Proponents of the new systems argue that private contractors have brought 
innovation and new capacity to service delivery and that competition and 
payment for performance has generated efficiencies and cost savings. 
Officials involved in the delivery of welfare to work services stress that 
contracting out has enabled them to speedily and flexibly expand capacity and 
restructure delivery systems (including, where required, the ability to 
renegotiate contracts). Critics dispute the idea that the conditions for effective 
competition exist and deem claims of efficiencies and savings illusory. The 
transaction costs of designing, awarding, and subsequently managing 
contracts are high, and critics have found that expenditure savings have 
resulted from “reducing services to clients while increasing profits to agencies” 
(Considine, 2005, p. 67: Brodkin, 2005; Struyven and Steurs, 2005). As 
problems have emerged public purchasers have been forced into frequent 
redesign of contracts and as regulations have become more prescriptive 
providers have less operational flexibility and capacity or ability to innovate. 
  
Each of the three countries has seen debate about the role of large scale 
national providers and controversy about their operation. In the USA in 
particular there has been much criticism of large providers in certain states 
(similar criticisms have now been made of some of the larger British 
providers: Davies, 2006). The US critics cite examples of corporate 
malpractice, including inadequate and poor provision of services, 
misappropriation of funds and other financial irregularities (Bryna Sanger, 
2003; DeParle, 2005).  In some US states the organisations involved have 
lost contracts; in others they have taken remedial action and continue to 
deliver services. The largest providers themselves point to their successful 
delivery of many other contracts and continue to stress the strength of the 
organisational, financial and management capacities they bring to the market. 
 
On a more general level the large providers in Australia, the USA and the 
Netherlands have emerged as a powerful interest group, locally and 
nationally, lobbying, for example, for further privatisation of services, and for 
changes in their contractual terms. In the UK such providers are now 
organised into the ‘Employment Related Services Association’ and have 
played a significant part in the debate on the future direction of the British 
welfare market.  
 
Involvement in welfare markets has had a major impact on voluntary sector 
organisations in the three countries, although in the Netherlands the non-
profits that lost business were different in that many had been created to 
deliver local government provision only. A detailed study of larger non-profit 
organisations in the USA found that while some struggled with the challenge 
of delivering major contracts others had improved their performance and 
‘developed services consistent with their social mission’ (Bryna Sanger, 
2003).   
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In Australia non-profits play a major role in delivering the Job Network, 
providing about half of the services available. The role of secular, community 
based non-profits has declined whilst that of church-based groups has 
increased. Two of the largest agencies are ‘Employment Plus’ (the Salvation 
Army) and Mission Australia. Secular organisations tend to operate as smaller 
specialist providers, catering for particular client groups or localities. Their 
continuing role has been secured in particular by two innovative networks – 
Jobs Australia and Job Futures – which through pooling risk and providing 
expertise have enabled remaining smaller non-profits to win and deliver JN 
contracts.  
 
The impact on smaller non-profit organisations in the USA has been less 
transparent, but many have lost contracts or voluntarily withdrawn from 
providing services. The experience of New York City, which introduced a 
prime contracting model, illustrates the impact of a ‘shake out’ of community 
based and smaller non-profits that followed. For some the loss of these ‘less 
effective’ providers increased efficiency, thereby improving services for 
clients. Others have argued that clients with special needs may be less well 
served and that while the loss of many of these local organisations “might not 
show up on a balance sheet” it undermines the already limited social capital of 
poor communities (Fischer, 2001, p.1; Bryna Sanger, 2003).  
 
Wider concerns have been expressed about the impact of welfare to work 
contracting on the values and practices of the non-profit sector (Murray, 
2006). There has been concern about ‘mission drift’ induced through the 
requirements of contracts and by the involvement of non-profits in processes 
that impose benefit sanctions, often on large numbers of disadvantaged and 
poor people. Others fear that contractual involvement reduces the autonomy 
and vitality of voluntary sector actors and may “mute their advocacy on behalf 




The evidence from Australia, the USA and the Netherlands reveals that 
contracting out employment assistance services is not a simple option and 
that the systems have been in flux over time. Securing the delivery of 
Government objectives through contracts is prone to the same 
implementation problems experienced in public sector delivery systems. 
Contracting out poses further challenges because it fragments programme 
responsibility amongst multiple contractors, changes the relationship between 
those who design policy and those who deliver front line services, and blurs 
lines of responsibility and accountability.  
 
The development and management of welfare markets is a complex and 
demanding task for administrators and managers. There is a sharp and 
continuous ‘learning curve’ and it takes time to learn how to steer the market 
to minimise perverse incentives and to capture the efficiencies and innovation 
that independent contractors can offer. The DWP Commissioning Strategy 
presents a coherent approach to managing such tensions in a way that seeks 
to retain the flexibility for providers to innovate and deliver greater outcomes. 
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Its successful implementation requires that DWP demonstrates also its 
capacity to be a ‘smart buyer’ and good ‘contract manager’ (Bryna Sanger, 
2003). 
 
Finally a looming challenge for the British Government’s strategy is its 
potential durability should recent turbulence in credit markets and 
recessionary forces persist. It will be difficult for the new welfare market to 
deliver the anticipated job outcomes in a context of increased caseloads and 
fewer jobs.  In such a context, the Flexible New Deal quickly may begin to 




This article draws on the findings from comprehensive reviews of welfare 
market developments in each of the three countries commissioned by the 
Joseph Rowntree Foundation and the Department for Work and Pensions. 
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